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Introduction 
 The US Small Business Association reports that 99.9% of all US business can be classified 
as small.  Having less than 500 employees small businesses provide work for just over half of all 
US private sector workers (2009).  Additionally, less than 2% of those businesses have between 
100-499 employees (Headd & Kirchhoff, 2009), leaving approximately 97% of all US businesses 
employing 99 or fewer employees.  Given this statistic, it would stand to reason that small 
businesses have a higher success rate than large ones; however, developing and opening a 
small business does not occur without risk.   The SBA reports that only 51% of new small firms 
last more than five years (2009).   When developing a business plan for a small company or 
corporation, consideration must be given to both the challenges and opportunities of 
entrepreneurialism such as the economy, competition and the workforce pool (Moutray, 2008).   
Nationally economic confidence is up among small business owners with the least 
amount of owners since February of 2008 rating the economy as poor (Rasmussen Reports, 
2009).  In post-Katrina New Orleans the sentiment amongst small business entrepreneurs is 
also encouraging; however the city’s general economic confidence is still guarded amid 
conflicting media reports of the long-term outlook of residential viability.   
Purpose 
Local research has revealed that since the storm some small business owners have 
recorded the best revenues they have ever had (Anonymous, (personal communication, March 
2008)) while others, even some considered New Orleans institutions such as O’Flaherty’s Irish 
Pub, have had to shutter their doors.  The unpredictable nature of which small businesses are 
succeeding in the wake of the post-Katrina recession has led to the purpose of this paper: to 
illustrate the challenges, milestones and progress SBOs and entrepreneurs are facing in post-
Katrina New Orleans.   
Angele Davis, then Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Culture, Recreation & 
Tourism, said in a 2007 interview with TheStreet.com (Mengisen, 2007), “A major part of [New 
Orleans’] newly recognized ‘cultural economy’ are the small businesses, which have been 
hanging on by a shoestring as grants and zero-interest loans have been slow in coming. Soon 
after Katrina, small-business owners recognized that Small Business Administration loans could 
not help them either because they lacked collateral or didn't otherwise qualify.  So people 
helped themselves ... restructured their businesses [and] rolled up their shirt sleeves and 
rebuilt from the ground up.”  This paper demonstrates that in a community rebranding its 
economic viability as its culture, small businesses are better for the both the culture and the 
economy. 
Justification 
New Orleans has always been a small business friendly city, with only one current 
Fortune 500 company (Entergy, ranked 205 in 2008) and only one additional Fortune 1000 
company (Superior Energy Service, ranked 933 in 2008).  Until 2007 and even before the 2005 
flooding, New Orleans only supported one additional Fortune 500 company headquarters: 
Freeport-McMoRan Corporation & Guild.  The New Orleans CityBusiness Book of Lists for 2007-
2008 (GNO, Inc., 2009) reports that there are only 44 companies in the greater New Orleans 
metropolitan region with 1000 or more employees.   
Small businesses generally re-circulate 30-33% of revenues back into their communities 
(some businesses up to 45%) and chain and box companies generally re-circulate 10-13% 
(AMIBA, 2005; Houston & Rodriguez, 2009; Houston & Eness, 2009; Truit, 2004) so maintaining 
a high percentage of small businesses in New Orleans is imperative to the economic future of 
the city.  The Urban Conservatory found that “If Orleans Parish consumers, including residents, 
institutions, and visitors, were to shift just 10% of all [consumer] activity for chains to local 
merchants, the result would be equivalent to injecting an additional $60M annually into the 
local economy in the form of re-circulated dollars that would have otherwise left the area.” 
(Houston & Eness, 2009).   
A literature review on business planning and execution during economic recessions, 
with a focus on post-Katrina New Orleans, is conducted.   A business plan for a small 
restaurant/theater concludes this study as an illustration of the entrepreneurial process of 
investing in the tourism industry, which directly comprises 12% of the New Orleans industry 
market and indirectly comprises up to 40% (GNO, Inc., 2008). 
Constraints 
The business plan that accompanies this paper will not be fully implemented during the 
writing of this paper due to time constraints.  The exercise of writing the plan will result in the 
author’s ability to continue past the conclusion of this paper with a personal implementation of 
the knowledge gained while writing it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GLOSSARY: 
Cultural Economy – referring to how cultural meanings are embedded in economics. 
Generally speaking the reference is made about how an economy relies on a 
distinct and recognizable culture to support it – without a distinct culture a city 
has no economy on which to build 
Disaster Tourism – referring to tourism resulting from visitors who go to a region after a 
disaster specifically to view the devastation and progress 
Economic confidence – a measure of five factors as to how money in an economy gets 
spent (or not) at any given time – are consumers confident that their economy is 
healthy enough to maintain their current spending trends, are industrial 
executives ordering the production of goods to be maintained, are services firms 
projecting positive or negative trends in the foreseeable future of the economy, 
are construction and trade executives confident that there will continue to be a 
demand for their industry 
Fortune 500 – an annual list of the largest 500 companies in the country, ranked by 
revenue generation 
Fortune 1000 – an annual list of the largest 1000 companies in the county, ranked by 
revenue generation 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization – national and global organizations without 
affiliation to a government (such as The Rotary Club and the World Economic 
Forum) 
Re-circulate – money that is returned to the local economy when it is spent locally, 
minus the cost of the original purchase; for example, when tax dollars reappear 
in the form of road repairs 
SBA – Small Business Association 
SBOs – Small Business Owners 
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Literature Review  
Introduction 
 Many cities and communities that fall victim to natural disasters are located in regions 
of the globe that attract tourism due to their natural beauty.  Coastal regions experience 
hurricanes, tsunamis and tourists escaping landlocked, arid, rural monotony.  Heartlands 
experience floods, tornadoes, and tourists escaping humidity, traffic and noise pollution.  
Mountains and highlands face avalanches, mudslides and tourists in search of fresh air, wildlife 
and the humbling feeling that the world is bigger than they are.    
The small businesses that exist in these geographically unstable regions undoubtedly 
exist on an operational edge that small businesses in geographically sound areas do not.  This 
literature review broadly reports how small businesses are affected in regions experiencing 
economic recessions as a result of natural disasters and narrows its focus eventually to the 
specific economic conditions in post-Katrina New Orleans.   
 
Small Business and Economic Recessions – What the Small Business Market can Expect 
All businesses should have a plan for how to operate successfully during economic 
recessions.  Small businesses, as their name indicates, do not have large revenues to rely on 
during times of financial hardships and often run on a streamlined budget, even during the best 
of times.  Patterns that occur in business cycles indicate when recession is on the horizon.  Alan 
Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve has been infamously quoted as saying that 
a drop in the sale of men’s underwear is one of the strongest signs of a recession, reasoning 
that there would be no reason for sales to not remain flat unless people were seriously 
concerned with their finances (Pavelsky & Harnett, 2009; Park, 2009).   
But, there are also serious indicators that can be monitored for business owners to 
prepare for slumps in business.  The Leading Economic Indicator and Index of Lagging Indicators 
are the most widely respected metrics of the US economy.  Used in conjunction with other 
business indices they can warn SBOs of what is happening to the economic market.  Reporting 
for Small Business Reports, Maurice Smith (1990) believes that not only are there indicators to 
monitor for signs of a recession, but small businesses need to be prepared for what to expect 
when the recession occurs.   
Smith concludes that recessions have always been and will continue to be more severe 
than the preceding one (1990).  In his conclusion he advises small businesses that reduced 
consumer spending on non-necessities may result in unpreventable lay-offs.  Historically, 
interest rates tend to rise during a recession and SBOs need to decide how much debt burden 
they are willing to take on.  Based on his findings, Smith recommends unnecessary assets be 
liquidated to fund the lean times expected as revenues fall. 
As each recession begins to come to an end Smith’s research reminds SBOs that the 
majority of the recession planning is certainly beneficial as the “bargains from “distress 
situations”” occur.  “Individuals and businesses that are prudent and build up their available 
cash [before the recession], will be able to bargain shop for valuable assets at substantial 
discounts” once other distressed businesses begin to become affected by the downturn (Smith, 
1990).     
Given the history of US recessions, recovery is inevitable.  “The current record-setting 
business expansion was born at the end of the worst post-war recession.  Although the next 
recession promises to be one for the history books, it will also sow the necessary seeds for the 
next recovery.  Such has been the nature of the business cycle for some 200 years.  By 
preparing to weather the next recession, the prudent businessperson is also preparing to take 
advantage of the next business expansion.” (1990). 
SBOs can also prepare for added competition in the small business market during a 
recessionary cycle.  Using the terms “survivalist” referring to mom and pop ventures, Yusuf & 
Schindehutte (2000) propose that the spirit of entrepreneurship in a community is closely tied 
to economic conditions, suggesting that as the economy worsens entrepreneurship rises.  
Concluding that, “sufficiently adverse conditions leave the people little alternative other than 
self-employment,” they report that of 17 offered Reasons Leading to Start-Ups, the four most 
chosen reasons for starting a small business were extrinsic and all related to earning more 
money (2000). 
 
Small Business and Economic Recessions – Current Market Optimism Index 
 The past year has been trying for SBOs, with the National Federation of Independent 
Business (NFIB) rating March 2009 with the second lowest reading of their Index of Small 
Business Optimism “in the 35 year history of the NFIB survey” (Dunkelberg & Wade, April 2009).  
Reporting that first quarter 09 job losses were the worst in the history of the survey, that May 
of 2009 saw the largest decline ever in average employment per firm (Dunkelberg & Wade, 
September 2009), that “inventories are being reduced at a record pace” and that capital 
expenditures for the past six months fell to a record low reading, NFIB paints a grim picture of 
small business economic trends.  SBOs across industries report that lagging sales and taxes as 
the leading two most important problems affecting optimism. 
 However, despite the foreboding reports of the NFIB there is also research literature 
supporting claims that severe economic recessions actually tend to spur an increase in creation 
of small businesses, more so than during times of financial prosperity.  Emergent Research, a 
consulting firm specializing in the analysis of small business trends and impacts, reports that in 
2009 the number of small businesses will actually increase and benefit from the governmental 
regulation of the banking industry and programs targeting small business (Ockels & King, 2009).   
Whether out of necessity from being downsized, distrust of large corporations or the search for 
a job that will let employees wear flip-flops and bring their dog, the small business market is 
often driven by the innovation that results from frustration with the prevailing system.   
 
Small Business and Economic Recessions – Strategy 
  Small business recessionary strategy has an advantage over its big business counterpart 
in that most of the research on the matter suggests that SBOs who pro-actively use recessions 
to leverage the creativity, flexible structure and proximity to the market (Latham, 2009) are 
able to maintain or improve their profitability.   
Shelly Lee wrote in her May 2009 article for The Journal of Financial Planning, “Guiding 
Your Small-Business Clients Through the Downtown Maze,” that the resiliency of small 
businesses during a recession can be compared “to the space shuttle’s path to and from its 
launch pad: The path is gravel, made of millions of little stones, each of which absorbs some of 
the weight and tension.  A solid, concrete surface would crack and buckle…”  Making the point 
that small businesses need to be prepared to be flexible with their operations during financially 
lean times, she further explains that after the recessions of the early 90’s, small businesses 
created 500,000+ more jobs that large corporations and by 2004, after the tech crash of the 
early 2000’s, small business was responsible for over 2/3 of all US operating profits.   
Churchill and Lewis (1984) surveyed 1057 entrepreneurs and SBOs after the recession 
that spanned 1977-1981 to determine if “small businesses can take effective measures to 
moderate the effects of an unfavorable economic climate.” 30.3% of Service-related small 
business reported that they were Hurt Severely by the recession and 31.9% reported that they 
were Hurt Somewhat by the recession, for a total of almost 2/3 of all Service-related 
respondents reporting that the recession negatively affected their business.     
Asking “How active or passive were the companies?” in response to the prevailing fiscal 
downturn Churchill and Lewis presented those surveyed with a list of forty-five common 
business responses to implement in response to economic decline that they could/should have 
considered while experiencing the recession.  They concluded that there were thirteen actions 
taken by those surveyed that are “illustrative of good management, whether in good times or 
bad” and that if the small business sector prepares for financial recessions it does not have to 
be at the mercy of the economic conditions.   
According to Churchill & Lewis (1984) the ten most common and effective measures 
that small businesses can take in advance of an economic recession are (in order of most 
effective): 
1. Monitor collections more closely 
2. Budget expenses and monitor compliance 
3. Change sales price 
4. Stop selling to or move some customers to COD who pay slowly 
5. Move toward purchasing-to-order rather than to inventory 
6. Streamline organization 
7. Require suppliers to deliver on shorter notice 
8. Change the number of units held in inventory of each different item (depth) 
9. Change the level of your borrowing overall 
10. Change the days outstanding of accounts payable 
 
Graham Beaver and Caroline Ross conducted a 1999 post-recession study for the journal 
Strategic Change surveying SBOs who identified themselves as users of strategic management 
during the preceding economic decline.  They report that small businesses that survived the 
mid-1990’s recession displayed several, if not all of these characteristics: 
• They had a firm grip on their finances 
• They examined business forecasts carefully and returned to the original business 
plan to check principal assumptions made about sales volume and cash flow 
• They reduced the money that debtors owed by implementing an effective credit 
management system and/or used factoring (put cash flow first, profit second and 
sales third) 
• They considered what purchases to make and deferred risky ones that were not 
necessary or negotiated better prices, extended credit or quicker deliveries to 
reduce stock.  Many had a pricing plan and took a strategic view when setting 
price. 
• They concentrated on tight stock control, reviewing and identifying areas where 
efficiency and costs could be improved.  Successful firms focused on stock efforts 
on high-price and high-volume items.  The also minimized work in progress and 
finished goods stocks by making production processes as streamlined as 
possible. 
• Sales and marketing activities were reviewed to increase efficiency and reduce 
costs where possible, including dropping marginal products and concentrating 
on the most non price-sensitive products and services. 
 
Post-disaster Economic Recovery – Examples from across the globe 
 Post-disaster economic recessions are different from national and global recessions 
because they are localized to the community/region that the disaster occurred in and they 
cannot be planned for.    In the post-tsunami, post-911, post-Katrina environment that SBOs 
now operate in, global NGOs have begun to address the issue of post-disaster livelihood 
recovery, although the parameters of what livelihood recovery means varies from location to 
location (and culture to culture) making it difficult to define.   
 According to a 2008 study published by Disaster Prevention and Management there is 
an emerging global consensus that while emergency relief is essential immediately following a 
disaster for the provision of shelter and survival equipment economic relief is dependent upon 
“the necessary shift from emergency relief to development reconstruction” (Regnier, et al., 
2008).   
 Studying post-tsunami India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, Regnier, et al., report that 
implementing microeconomics and creating micro-entrepreneurship programs have had the 
most success restoring the pre-disaster livelihood situation of these particular 
communities/regions because the communities that were devastated were relatively and 
primarily poor villages and most pre-disaster enterprise was very small.  However, the World 
Bank reports that since the small amount of post-disaster economic recovery research that has 
been done focuses on a limited list of localized and specific regions, there is not enough 
conceptual knowledge to have applicable global theories “regarding the facilitation of post-
disaster business rehabilitation” (2005).    
Instead, the World Bank suggests that one of the biggest priorities of post-disaster relief 
should be employment for affected citizens.  Stating that “sending in canned food and used 
clothing … is enormously counterproductive” the 2005 World Bank report claims that providing 
employment opportunities to natural disaster victims for the salvage of (re)building materials 
will supply those displaced with both financial opportunity and a psychological goal that 
reaches beyond the immediate grief associated with the devastation. 
 However, Regnier, et al., also uncovered an unexpected dilemma that often occurs from 
the generosity of extensive humanitarian assistance – that the aid and intervention received to 
help rebuild areas devastated by natural disasters actually tend to exceed the amount needed 
to simply replicate the pre-existing economy of a region.  Unfortunately, an overabundance of 
aid usually precedes large-scale (corporate) reconstruction projects and large-scale 
intervention, leaving the redeveloping community, itself, at risk of being left out of the 
redevelopment process.  
In 2006, Tony Lloyd-Jones reported in a project for the Max Lock Centre at the 
University of Westminster that “humanitarian agencies and most development aid institutions 
have none or few competencies in micro-entrepreneurship.” Regnier, et al., agree with Lloyd-
Jones’ findings, stating “grass-root livelihood restoration projects have … less political 
attractiveness and public visibility than large-scale intervention” and too often the 
humanitarian projects end up victims themselves, as corruption results from inadequate 
oversight (2008).  The tsunamis set the bar high for expectations of global disaster relief, but 
provided little example of what to do with the resources once they arrived at the disaster site. 
 
Post-disaster Economic Recovery – Barriers to Recovery and Enhanced Crisis Response  
 There is little scholarly literature on post-disaster economic recovery and even less on 
the post-disaster recovery of small businesses.  The previous section of this paper and the 
literature cited within it illustrate that there is ample post-disaster response for regions 
devastated by unplanned catastrophe, but there is no literature on best practices or 
methodologies for recovery.  The author attempted to research both post-earthquake San 
Francisco and post-911 New York City small business recovery and the major takeaways from 
the journals and articles read were that time and personal passion are the only constants that 
factor into recovery – with most sources citing the incompletion of the Twin Towers site as how 
post-disaster regions can expect the government to assist with (or hinder, as the case may be) 
recovery.  The consensus of the literature was that if SBOs want to recover, they are simply 
going to have to do it themselves. 
 There is some crisis management literature reporting on how small business can plan 
and mitigate crisis events, but even that literature is scarce.  In 2005 Rodney Runyan completed 
the only scholarly study this author was able to find specifically regarding the effects of crisis on 
small business owners, but his study was concerned only with post-Katrina New Orleans and 
did not specifically address the recession that followed the storm.  The majority of his research 
focused on the mitigation of future crises, knowing what we know now.   
Cater & Chadwick completed an exploratory study for Nicholls State University in 2008 
that also examined small business response to crisis and disaster.  Their case study draws upon 
both small business literature and crisis management literature but admittedly finds little 
literature addressing the two together.  Proposing four factors that inhibit crisis response and 
six factors that enhance it, and “Because [their] study is exploratory in nature, [they] invite 
further research into the area of small business and crisis management,” Cater & Chadwick’s 
literature review supports this author’s lack of scholarly findings on post-disaster small business 
economic recovery. 
 While all literature on economic recovery addresses the understanding that businesses 
need both employees and customers, following a disaster with the scope of Hurricane Katrina 
both of those elements tend to disappear.  The difference between small business and large 
business in regards to employees and customers is that small businesses often do not have the 
resources to plan how to recover either one of them.  Runyan’s study (2005) revealed that 
there is little crisis planning conducted by small business.  Reporting on Hurricane Katrina 
Runyan found, “Most business owners went through their normal pre-storm routine boarding 
up windows and doors, moving computers on top of desks and closing early.  But a very small 
number (perhaps one or two out of hundreds) actually removed inventory, and none reported 
moving equipment.”  This complacency was attributed to the frequency of looming 
meteorological disaster and the fact that it had been a over a generation (40 years) since a 
hurricane (Betsy) actually caused widespread damage in the metropolitan area.  Few residents 
felt they needed to plan or had cause for alarm because they had never seen a storm leave the 
devastation that Katrina did.   
 Runyan’s study also revealed that in post-disaster recovery one of the largest barriers 
small businesses face is a fear of what large businesses will do.  Competing with the resources 
that large businesses and chains have access to and being priced out of the market of 
customers that is already a fraction of its original size is a risk that small businesses owner’s are 
not sure they want to take considering the losses already sustained.  This revelation in Runyan’s 
study corresponds with Martin’s (2005) argument that the level of crisis following a disaster 
may be dependent on the size of the business.  Small businesses need the day-to-day cash flow 
to operate and large businesses generally have capital to borrow against when cash floes slow.  
Runyan was, however, also able to conclude that SBOs who were able to open in the storm’s 
aftermath actually experienced an increase in sales over previous recent sales patterns.  Fewer 
competition and remaining population being concentrated in viable housing areas created a 
captured audience for businesses who reopened quickly.   
 Finally, Runyan’s study revealed that at the time of his research (six months after the 
flooding) there was still little discussion of what SBOs learned from the disaster and the primary 
barrier to recovery was identified as FEMA (often interchanged with the SBA, although the 
issues with the two agencies were ultimately identified as distinct, with the FEMA issues being 
ranked as more detrimental to progress).   
FEMA’s allocation of financial allowances to victims for food, shelter, and lost wages was 
identified as the largest problem SBOs faced.  “The [small business owners in Runyan’s study] 
felt strongly that workers needed to fill jobs were being provided with a disincentive to work” 
from FEMA.  SBOs needed labor and perceived FEMA’s assistance as competition, feeling that 
had residents been forced to continue to work, they would have. 
 Cater & Chadwick (2008) research disaster response from a less immediate perspective 
than Runyan although the ultimate goal of their study is a similar, albeit more comprehensive, 
one: while Runyan sought to identify what went wrong, Cater & Chadwick seek not only to 
identify what went wrong, but what went right.   
The four propositions of small business crisis response inhibitors they identify are: 
1. Limited financial resources inhibit the small firm’s response to external crisis. 
2. Communication difficulties inhibit the small firm’s response to external crisis. 
3. Difficulties in supply logistics inhibit the small firm’s response to external crisis. 
4. Governmental bureaucracy inhibits the small firm’s response to external crisis. 
 
The six propositions of small business crisis response enhancers they identify are: 
1. A sense of proximity enhances the small firm’s response to external crisis. 
2. The ability to move rapidly enhances the small firm’s response to external crisis. 
3. A concern for employee welfare enhances the small firm’s response to external 
crisis. 
4. The versatility of employees enhances the small firm’s response to external 
crisis. 
5. Networking relationships, especially in the form of strong ties to local 
stakeholder groups, enhance the small firm’s response to external crisis. 
6. A concern for community welfare enhances the small firm’s response to external 
crisis. 
 
 Post-Katrina New Orleans – The social and economic devastation 
The per-capita income (PCI) in New Orleans has “gyrated like an economic yo-yo” since 
Katrina, according to Scott Thomas of BizJournals.com (2009).  Ironically, in June 2005, just six 
weeks before the storm, New Orleans was rated #1 as the US city (with more than 250K 
residents) for the fastest growing PCI (from 2000-2003) by an American City Business Journals 
study compiled with data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (Thomas, 2005).  In 2009 
New Orleans was again ranked #1 as residents and businesses return to the city, but following 
Katrina, New Orleans was ranked last in the same study in 2007.     
Also in 2007, The Southern Economic Journal printed the results of a symposium 
comparing the resiliency of Hurricane Katrina victims throughout the initial stages of recovery.  
Boettke, et al., conclude that in general “many of the governmental policies adopted to deal 
with the crisis and that guide the rebuilding effort along the Gulf Coast have had the 
unintended and undesirable consequence of slowing the process of recovery.”  (2007).   
Beginning with a history of underperformance on scales economic freedom (ranked 40th out of 
50 states in 2004; Huang, et al., 2004)) and concluding with historical corruption statistics 
(ranked the third most corrupt in 2004 by Corporate Crime Reporter), the journey of the New 
Orleans economy is illustrated by Boettke, et al., as one that faces more struggles than hope.  
Mentioning the same frustrations that Runyan (2005) had with FEMA’s extension of 
unemployment benefits and creation of a FEMA-based economy resulting from “government 
provision of goods and services long after immediate needs [had] passed,” the research of 
Boettke, et al. support the traditional classification of New Orleans as a welfare city and not a 
modern one.   
The challenges of reconstruction after the storm are exacerbated by the historical social 
conflicts in New Orleans that have led to this classification as a welfare state.  Specifically, there 
exists an institutionalized racism locally (for example, the mayor infamously proclaiming the 
return of his chocolate city) and a distrust of the state government out of Baton Rouge as the 
conservative epicenter of the state decides what is best for the largest, most liberal city in the 
state.  Combined with the lack of federal support for permanent recovery and a repeated denial 
of reconstruction funds either for flood protection (wetland restoration and levee fortification) 
or housing, the entrepreneurial spirit of the city struggles to maintain.  The ‘social capital’ that 
the city needs to generate revenue has been drained as residents fall victim again in wake of a 
perception of government failure. 
 
Post-Katrina New Orleans - Tourism 
The New Orleans Conventions and Visitor’s Bureau (NOCVB) released their 
Tourism/Hospitality Industry Update in August 2008 summarizing the condition of the tourism 
market in the city.  This report was designed as a tool to encourage both visitors and investors.  
Summarizing the 92% increase in tourism from 2006 to 2007 as hotels, festivals and major 
events return to the city, the report reminds readers that tourism is the largest employer in the 
metropolitan area, providing 69K jobs.  Tourism also generates $5B in visitor spending 
revenues, translating into 35% of the city’s operating budget via tax collection.  Supporting 
Miller’s 2008 article “Disaster tourism and disaster landscape attractions after Hurricane 
Katrina” the NOCVB also reports that “many organizations are choosing to participate in 
volunteerism projects to give back to our community and accelerate neighborhood recovery” 
(2008).   
Miller’s article is auto-ethnographic because there is very little scholarly research on 
disaster tourism, but he makes reference to psychological and anthropological motivations for 
both tourism and investment in disaster areas.  Citing the historical wonder that travelers have 
for “visiting sites where martyrs once stood, patriots met a heroic death, or masses of people 
died,” Miller echoes the findings of travel writer Rolf Potts in his essay The Allure of Disaster 
Tourism (2006) reiterating that “travelers are increasingly becoming fascinated with visiting 
sites of ‘high emotional impact’ that are associated with death, disaster and other atrocities – 
includ[ing]  New York City (World Trade Center), Honolulu (USS Arizona Pearl Harbor Memorial 
Museum), Auschwitz…” Potts likens travelling to New Orleans to celebrate Mardi Gras in 2006 
to travelling “to Dresden to celebrate Oktoberfest in 1946” (2006).   
Miller’s opinion that “The Katrina disaster tours that are sold in New Orleans put 
suffering, years of governmental neglect, poor civic planning, a failed government response, 
and centuries of racial and environmental injustice on the map” (2008) allow for the rebranding 
of New Orleans as both the entertainment destination that it was and an inspiration for “hope, 
survival and renewal from utter devastation” (Miller, 2008).  NOCVB’s 2008 proclaimation that 
“New Orleans as a tourist destination has a fresher product, cleaner streets, new attractions 
and hotels, more restaurants, record-breaking attendance at cultural festivals, and a renewed 
sense of hospitality” is supported by reports that New Orleans saw 7.8M visitors in 2008, which 
is 91% of the pre-Katrina average of 8.5M.  Considering that only approximately 68% of the pre-
Katrina population of New Orleans had returned by 2008, this disproportionate relationship in 
tourism (and tax revenues) to population should result in a greater return to the average 
business owner in New Orleans, no matter what the size of the business. 
 
Post-Katrina New Orleans – Deciding to reopen and/or invest 
As of August 2008 the city of New Orleans had written and attempted to implement 
three different recovery plans.  Immediately following the storm Mayor Ray Nagin created the 
Bring New Orleans Back Commission, which proposed a questionably legal (Olhansky, et al., 
2008) neighborhood-based plan that initially shrunk both the residential footprint of the city 
and resident’s trust in the city’s recovery planning.  The second recovery proposal was the 
Lambert Plans, which were commissioned by the city council and focused primarily on a 
partnership with an urban planning and advisory board out of Miami.  This plan was flawed in 
that it did not address the viability of each of the 49 neighborhoods it planned to rebuild.  In the 
end the Lambert Plans did not meet the Louisiana Recovery Authority’s conditions for planning 
and were scrapped.  The final (and very slowly on-going) recovery plan was originally called 
(and still referred to as) the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP), but is formally known as the 
New Orleans Strategic Recovery and Redevelopment plan.  It is a complicated plan that involves 
several funding sources and consists of several layers of commissions and governing bodies.   
Although released about two years after the storm, the purpose of UNOP was and is still 
unclear to SBOs, however.  Having been described using terms such as ““blueprint,” 
“framework,” “roadmap,” and “strategy”” (Olhansky, et al., 2008) UNOP has seemed more like 
an exercise in “infrastructure financing and coordination” (Olhansky, et al., 2008) than about 
redevelopment or recovery.  Without an explanation of what benefits UNOP would produce for 
small businesses, those that would rebuild had to begin before having any idea when/what aid 
would be available to them. 
Chamlee-Wright suggests, in an article for the International Journal of Social Economics, 
that the response to Katrina by SBOs and corporations generated a “spirit of enlightened self-
interest” (2008) and reflected impatience with government assistance.  Concluding that 
“strategies deployed by private citizens served as the principal source of community rebound in 
the months following the storm” (2008), Chamlee-Wright chastises government failure to 
support SBOs with the resources to return and even goes so far to say that public policy actually 
impeded small business rebuilding.     
In the wake of the majority of the city’s population evacuating (and relocating) and 
amongst the proposals for rebuilding plans which, as stated above, included options for 
reducing the city’s footprint, SBOs and entrepreneurs faced other challenges besides 
governmental bureaucracy, as well.  Crime, insurance rates, housing rents and political scandals 
were up, with quality of education, city services and white collar job opportunities on the 
decline.  Deciding to invest in such a precarious situation without knowing what the future 
holds is risky. 
Lam, et al. (2009) released a report of factors influencing small businesses to 
open/reopen in New Orleans which spans the two years following the storm.  Illustrating that 
factors change as the social and political climate in the city changes, Lam, et al. conducted a 
three-part survey of over 8000 New Orleans-based businesses from December 2005 until 
October 2007.  Analysis of the data concludes that in the first four months after the storm less 
that 26% of pre-Katrina number of businesses had opened, 39% after 10 months and 66% after 
two years (2009).    Lam, et al. also report that by the third survey only 19% of businesses rated 
the recovery of the economy as satisfactory and 45% rated recovery as unsatisfactory. In 
December 2005 the top three most important reasons that small business owners reported as a 
problem to opening were levees, lack of customers and employees (lack of and poor quality to 
choose from).  By the third survey in October 2007 the most important reasons (from the same 
list) were crime, levee, and employees (again, lack of and poor quality).   
 
Post-Katrina New Orleans – Timeline: Challenges, Milestones and Progress for Small Businesses 
over the Past Four Years 
 
November 2005 – Bi-partisan politicking and bureaucracy hindered small business 
recovery immediately after Katrina.  A $595M small business recovery package was 
sent to the senate three separate times as Senators fought over who would be 
named as official authors of the bill.   In addition, “A month after Katrina, the SBA 
had received 3218 applications for small business disaster loans but had approved 
only 12” (Gajilan, 2005).  Left to their own devices approximately 2800 small 
business entrepreneurs belonging to the Louisiana Association of Business and 
Industry, began their own relief fund and by November had distributed over 600 
grants (Gajilan, 2005).   
 
August 2006 – The Bring New Orleans Back Commission decided to let individual 
neighborhoods coordinate their own recovery plans, with $3.5M available from a 
Rockefeller Foundation grant.  What was still unclear at this time was how small 
businesses could apply for the grant.  The city had laid-off over 2400 workers and 
was being operated by FEMA employees who deferred SBOs to the over-taxed and 
under-staffed SBA.   Lack of affordable housing made staffing virtually impossible for 
national chains to open quickly, despite their immediate humanitarian efforts, and 
over 80% of SBOs lost their homes.  $107.8M had been committed to fighting the 
impact of Katrina, but only 17% was allocated for long-term building and recovery 
(Mann, 2006). 
March 2007 – Small businesses that had returned were struggling to capture the smaller 
market, exaggerated by the fact that per capita there were now actually more small 
businesses than pre-Katrina (Britt, 2007).  “Hang-ups over federal aid packages, 
massive insurance hikes and difficulties in redeveloping the region – not to mention 
perpetual safety concerns over level reconstruction and periodic spikes in crime in 
poorer regions – have conspired to create what some call the Battle for New 
Orleans” (Britt, 2007).  In February 2007 a local meeting of small business owners to 
discuss federal and state aid to rebuild expected 150 attendees and 600 showed up.  
Enough time had passed for businesses owners to make a profit from taking pot 
shots at the government’s response to the storm with t-shirt slogan’s such as “Make 
Levees, not War” gaining national attention. 
 
August 2007 – The national small business scene started to recognize New Orleans as a 
city with an entrepreneurial spirit as the last three quarters of 2006 saw “a net [gain 
of] 968 employer companies, representing a return to about 80% of pre-Katrina 
levels” (Tozzi, 2007).  The online business market was especially seeing a boom in 
New Orleans as commercial office rents remained well below the national 
metropolitan averages.  The New Orleans Exchange was founded in New Orleans by 
a former managing director for Citigroup out of New York, who said, “the New 
Orleans Exchange might pay 10 times as much in New York to rent the kind of loft 
space his company has” (Tozzi, 2007).  Online companies were also desirable in an 
environment that may require a last minute evacuation.  Blake Killian, the founder of 
Killian Interactive, an online marketing start-up has said, “We just [grab] our laptops 
and [head] to higher ground” (Tozzi, 2007).    Small business incubators and support 
centers also began to show a presence in the city in late 2007.  The Idea Village 
gained credibility and the Entrepreneur’s Organization Accelerator was launched “to 
help early-stage companies grow” (Tozzi, 2007).   
 
May 2008 – The city used its culture and art to distract residents and visitors from the 
increase in crime.  In 2007 the volatility of the city perpetuated the murder rate to 
the highest in the nation, a statistic that the city had been fighting and winning 
against since the mid-90’s when it was also the highest in the nation.   At the same 
time, the New Orleans Jazz and Heritage Fest drew record numbers (Jones & 
McGuigan, 2008) and albums and books about New Orleans flooded the mainstream 
–with appropriate titles such as Why New Orleans Matters, City of Refuge, The River 
in Reverse, City That Care Forgot and My People Need a Second Line, to name a few. 
 
September 2008 – The threat of Hurricane Gustav did significant damage to the morale 
of the small business community in New Orleans.  Even with 7900 less businesses in 
the city than prior to Katrina, unemployment was only at 4.1%, the lowest in the US 
(Ruiz, 2008).  With labor already in short supply, the threat of Gustav caused the 
collective, Greater New Orleans, Inc. to “[consider] offering business disruption 
insurance as part of an incentive package” to small business entrepreneurs (Ruiz, 
2008).   
 
May 2009 – “New Orleans asks: What Recession?”  As the only state with positive 
employment numbers (Jonsson & Knox, 2009), Louisiana – and New Orleans – had 
finally seen a significant influx of the federal money earmarked for recovery.  “The 
$14.4B federal levee-improvement project, a new $3B refinery on the city’s west 
side, the $500K renovation of the Jackson Barracks military base and a $60M 
downtown residential complex called 930 Poydras are all bucking the dreary 
national total for construction” and “entrepreneurs in New Orleans say the real 
reason the city has outperformed expectations is the human capital that has flowed 
into the city… young, highly educated and socially conscious risk-takers looking for a 
“livable city” to make their marks on the world” (Jonsson & Knox, 2009). 
 
July 2009 – In addition to the Idea Village, four entrepreneurial resource centers 
formed: Entrepreneur’s Row, the Icehouse, the IP (Intellectual Property) and the 
Entergy Innovation Center.  Likening New Orleans to “Prague after the curtain” and 
the Bay Area in the mid-90’s (circa the Silicon Valley boom), “entrepreneurs are 
reinventing New Orleans” (Ellin, 2009).  Seema Sudan, an entrepreneur who moved 
to New Orleans in 2007 was drawn to the relatively low-cost of real estate in New 
Orleans and had “never been in a place that is so community-oriented” (Ellin, 2009).     
 
September 2009 – Demand for disaster loans from the SBA pressured an extension of 
the Gulf Opportunity Loan Pilot Program (GO Loan) until September 2010. 
“Businesses actually starting, restarting and in some cases moving to the region is 
not something that will happen always immediately after a disaster” said a 
spokesman for the SBA (White, 2009).   
 
Literature Conclusion 
 If small business in New Orleans were to receive a presidential-style state-of-the-union 
address, this author would proclaim the city’s condition as strong, but guarded.  While the 
economic confidence of entrepreneurs is greater than ever in light of recent reports that 
tourism has already returned to over 90% of its pre-Katrina levels, the economic confidence of 
the overall metropolitan market is cautious as the population has reached only 75% of pre-
Katrina numbers (Scallan, 2009).      
This literature review has revealed that there is little scholarly research on economic 
recessions specifically addressing the post-disaster recovery of small business.  There is also 
little scholarly research available on disaster tourism; however, the literature that is available 
spotlights the city of New Orleans as an example for discussion of both disaster planning and 
revitalization research.  Highlighting that small business owners have felt more frustration with 
the government than satisfaction, the literature also emphasizes the city’s entrepreneurial 
spirit and dedication to the cultural economy.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business Plan 
For the Creation of a Restaurant/Dinner Theater 
(Business Name TBD, to be referred to as The Theater) 
 
Executive Summary 
 The Theater will be a dinner-theater-style restaurant showing films for moviegoers who 
also wish to enjoy a full-service meal.  It will be located in New Orleans, LA and will feature prix-
fix menus that celebrate the culture of each film being shown.  The genre emphasis will be on 
cult classics such as Office Space and The Big Lebowski, timeless classics such as Breakfast at 
Tiffany’s and It Happened One Night, and art house films such as A Clockwork Orange and Blue 
Velvet.   
 The décor will feature vintage movie posters and will have a combination of art deco 
and pop art influences with elemental accents such as black lacquer and velour.  The staff will 
need to have a passion for cinema and understand the influence that New Orleans has had on 
the film industry.   
 The food will be inspired by the entertainment and will not have a general theme.  
There is hopes that a liquor license will be granted, but if not BYOB will be encouraged and a 
bar featuring all the glassware, mixers and condiments that a full bar would feature will be 
available. 
 The combination of restaurant and film is a relatively unique concept that has only been 
entertained once before in the New Orleans area.  Movie Pitchers was a movie venue that 
greeted guests with a lobby bar featuring (you guessed it, pitchers of draft beer) and offered 
quick serve food such as chicken fingers and jalapeno poppers; guests waited for their food at a 
counter and took it into the theaters with them.  Movie Pitchers closed in 2000.  The Theater 
will be a full service upscale casual restaurant and will celebrate food that complements films 
with niche audiences.  The Theater will merge the Dinner & A Movie concept into one location. 
Mission 
 The Theater celebrates niche films and offers cuisine that complements features of each 
film such as setting, actors, characters, plot and music.  Combining food that highlights 
elements of the film with the viewing experience itself will create an entertainment destination 
for all five senses.   
 The Theater will strive to educate the community about the significance of film to the 
economy.  This will be accomplished via The Theater’s philanthropic partnership with the Arts 
Council of New Orleans and New Orleans Film Festival. 
Keys to Success 
1. Selection of films that have distinct characteristics that can be interpreted and 
enhanced with a dining experience. 
2. Unusual décor which is not available for enjoyment at other theaters. 
3. A high quality menu with fresh local ingredients. 
4. A chef/cook with a secondary passion for film. 
5. A team of front of house employees who have a passion for film. 
6. A Situational Learning (SLII) management style that rewards the workforce for creativity 
and dedication. 
7. Leveraging management’s experience and expertise in a varied background of food, 
beverage and entertainment. 
8. Developing management visibility to generate business leads and “buzz.” 
9. Strict control of cost, internal finances and cash flow at all time, without exception. 
 
Among the Motion Picture Association of America’s (MPAA) highlights for 2008 in the film 
industry: 
• Domestic box office reached the highest total in history at $9.8 billion in 2008, up 1.7% 
over 2007, and up 6.8% over five years ago. At the same time, theater admissions were 
1.4 billion in 2008, down 2.6% over 2007. Admissions have stayed relatively flat in the 
past ten years, with the exception of 2002’s high of 1.6 billion admissions. 
• Movie theaters continue to draw more people than all theme parks and major U.S. 
sports combined. Going to the movies is one of the most affordable entertainment 
outings for families – with admission prices remaining significantly lower than 
alternative entertainment options. 
• In 2008 the average movie ticket price in the U.S. rose to $7.18, a 4.4% increase over 
2007. 
• The number of screens in the U.S. remained constant at just over 40,000 in 2008. 
• Over 115,000 businesses in all 50 states – 81 percent of which employ fewer than 10 
people – comprise the motion picture and television industry. 
 Objectives 
1. Create a theater that celebrates the culture of each movie with a meal that highlights 
cinematic elements such setting, actors, characters, plot and music.   
a. Two screens maximum 
b. In each screening room table seating for 30 and casual seating for up to 50 
2. Show second run niche movies with an emphasis on cult classics, timeless classics and 
art house films.  The staff will wear clothing that reflects the genre of each movie to 
enhance the cultural atmosphere. 
a. Profitability within three months achieved with tight cost controls  
3. Deliver upscale casual pre-fixe meals that emphasize the culture of each movie with 
courses that are delivered at times during the film that increases both the dining and 
eating experience 
a. Food costs not to exceed 35% 
b. Beverage costs not to exceed 25% 
 
Company Ownership 
 The Theater will be an LLC, owned and operated by the author.  There are no long term 
plans for expansion. 
Start-Up Summary 
 Start-up costs include lease of the space, build out if not already designed for restaurant 
operations, legal fees including insurance, artwork & décor, logo design, marketing, liquor & 
occupancy licenses, operating supplies & equipment for foodservice (china, glass, silver, kitchen 
small wares), food and beverage inventory, theater equipment (projector, screen, sound 
equipment), office equipment & supplies, and labor.  Due to time constraints, this business plan 
doest not outline specific costs. 
Market Segmentation 
 The target market of The Theater is residents of New Orleans who primarily reside in the 
French Quarter, Marigny-Triangle, Marigny, By-Water, Esplanade Ridge, Mid-City, Bayou St 
John, Lakeview (south of I-610), the Central Business District, the Warehouse District and the 
Lower Garden District which are the neighborhoods associated with zip codes 70130, 70116, 
70119, 70117 and one-third of 70124.  This market was chosen due to the likely locations of 
The Theater being in the French Quarter, Lower Garden District or Marigny, all of which have 
parking constraints.  These areas house approximately 50K of the metro’s 154K residents (GNO, 
October 2009).  All of these areas of the city have high repopulation since Hurricane Katrina 
(GNO, September 2009).  The 2007 estimated median income for these zip codes (CityData, 
2007) were 70130: $37,552, 70116: $30,099, 70119: $30,309, 70117: $27,847 and 70124: 
$73,553 for an average income of the target markets as $39,872.   
With average rents in these zip codes of $850-967, rents equal about 27% of income. 
This leaves residents with some expendable income, as the federal government sets a 
benchmark of 30% or below as the percentage of income quantifying a renter as living in 
affordable housing (GNO, 2009).  The Theater would like to see repeat patrons on average of 
twice a month (once a paycheck). 
 The choice of film will influence the demographics of the target market, but it is 
expected that all patrons will be at minimum, novice foodies.  Cult classics will primarily appeal 
to a 27-40 years old, middle-class, artistic hipster-types, but also have specific fan bases that 
defy profiling (such as Reefer Madness); timeless classics will appeal to a broader audience of 
35+ years old, middle-to-upper-class, professionals who consider themselves arts connoisseurs; 
and art house films will appeal to a more cinematically experienced, cerebral audience who 
likely exists on the periphery of their day to day life. 
 The owner would like to have a small appeal to a niche market of tourists who are 
looking for something other than the Bourbon Street or Disaster Tour experience.  There are a 
growing number of tourists who come to New Orleans to be “New Orleanians” for a small 
amount of time and seek to experience life the way locals do.  Films will occasionally chosen 
that appeal to the tourist market that is in the city (such as for a particular convention). 
Competition 
 There are only 12 total movie theaters in greater New Orleans (within 40 miles) and only 
four theaters in the city limits of New Orleans.  There are no theaters that serve food other 
than concessions.   
 Zeitgeist Multi-Disciplinary Arts Center that presents “film, video, performance art, 
visual art and literary events six nights a week, year-round” (Zeitgeist Theater, 2009).  Zeitgeist 
does have a small counter service café at its location as the center is a multi-purpose building. 
 The Entergy IMAX Theater is located at the Aquarium of the Americas.  It is sponsored 
by the Audubon Nature Institute and primarily shows films celebrating the wonders of nature. 
 The Grand Theaters at Canal Place is a traditional movie theater with three screens; 
however, it is currently closed for renovations and will not open until April 2010. 
 The Prytania Theater is a single screen theater.  The theater does show a variety of 
movies (now showing Disney’s new Christmas Carol with Jim Carrey during the afternoons and 
early evenings, Gone with the Wind three days a week at noon, and Blazing Saddles on the 
weekends at midnight).   
 There is no direct competition for The Theater in New Orleans.  It will also have a 
competitive edge in that patrons will also be able to view the films without purchasing dinner. 
Strategy and Implementation 
 Areas that need to be researched further but were outside the scope of this 
presentation of The Theater’s business plan are Sales Forecasts, a Management Summary with 
a personnel plan, a Financial Plan including start-up funding, a break-even analysis, projected 
profit & loss and projected cash flow. 
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